signaling emphasize that an authoritarian state has more difficulty in making credible statements about its intentions than a democratic state. 4 However, China has already been growing rapidly for almost three decades, and there is little evidence that the region is devolving into balancing, nor that China's rise is causing undue alarm in the region. 5 Surely, given the anticipatory nature of the pessimistic arguments --that states prepare for future contingencies today -China's growth should already have prompted a reaction from East Asian states. Stability is also not the result of the United States as an offshore balancer that attenuates regional conflicts and balances Chinese power, and which East Asian states welcome. 6 Only Taiwan -and perhaps Japan -clearly rely on a U.S. security umbrella to balance Chinese power. There is a spectrum of relations between the U.S. and China, and while no state is completely allied with China, many states are at least accommodating its rise ( Figure 1 ).
States such as Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines, and even South Korea could be much more focused on aligning with the U.S., but they have chosen not to do so. Indeed, the case of East Asia belies the notion that some states are "too small to balance." With a potential offshore balancer in the U. The Microfoundations of Hierarchy 7 I use the term "hierarchy" instead of "hegemony," because hegemony implies a comprehensive systemlevel dominance. My argument is focused on a region, and none of the East Asian states are challenging the U.S. for global leadership, nor do any states -including China -want to drive the U.S. out of the region. 8 On different types of rising powers, see Charles Glaser, Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models," World Politics 44 (July 1992). 9 I define "East Asia" as comprising the states roughly from Japan through ASEAN.
secondary states under its wing in empire, and yet also does not cause other states to balance against it. Although much of the literature emphasizes that a rising power poses potential costs, just as importantly a rising power also offers potential benefits to secondary states. While a rising power may demand concessions or territory from the secondary state, it may also offer benefits from a growing economy and lower defense spending if relations between the two are warm. 10 Balancing a rising power puts the balancer in a better position to avoid potential costs, if there is conflict. However, balancing will also be more likely to limit the benefits of cooperation with the rising power, and potentially raise costs through added defense expenditures and creating conflict where there may be none to begin with. By contrast, aligning with the rising power puts the smaller state in a more vulnerable position relative to the rising power, but also increases the probability of its enjoying the benefits the rising power can provide.
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Thus, a secondary state's decision will depend in part on the tradeoff between the costs and benefits the rising power potentially provides. Most Asian states see China's threat as relatively low, but also see the benefits of having warm relations with it as relatively high.
However, while material factors are important elements of hierarchy, shared expectations about state preferences are just as important a factor. 12 In a system of unequal (or "unbalanced") power, it is not just security and economic relations, but also China, then the system will be stable even in the context of rising power.
Signaling China's Intentions
Viewed in material terms, China's rise poses both potential costs and potential benefits. The potential costs of China's rise are fairly obvious. The richer and more powerful that China becomes, the more likely it can bully other states. Furthermore, were
China to provoke a war somewhere in East Asia, it would effect the entire region and quite possibly the United States. However, the potential benefits from China's rise are just as obvious. As both a consumer and a producer, the Chinese market is increasingly seen to hold the future for many companies worldwide, and many countries -including the U.S. -are attempting to gain access to the Chinese market. 15 In addition, good relations with China also hold the possibility for regional stability and a spillover of increased economic and diplomatic cooperation.
Of all the Asian states, Japan is the most likely to have the capability to challenge China's regional leadership, and the ultimate direction of Japan-China relations is still evolving. However, it is significant that so far, Japan has not sought regional leadership and appears unlikely to do so in the future. 16 Although Japan and China still have unsettled historical animosities and territorial disputes, Japan-China economic ties have been rapidly increasing and the two countries cooperate on a range of issues.
East Asian states believe China because its signals to East Asia about its intentions
have become more moderate even as its power has increased. China's power has risen over the past three decades, it yet over that time it has moderated its rhetoric, resolved a number of territorial disputes with its neighbors, and joined (and proposed) a number of international and regional institutions. Most significantly, China has been willing to put in writing that is has no intention of using force in Southeast Asia. Indeed, the Chinese Communist Party's main claim to legitimacy is its economic record.
Furthermore, China realizes explicitly that it would gain very little from starting conflicts with its neighbors, but has much to gain from warmer ties. 19 Even when China has become the undisputed dominant Asian power, it is unlikely that China could gain anything from provoking military conflicts with its neighbors. In this context, states in East Asia tend to find credible China's reassurance signals that it intends to be a responsible leader.
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Conclusion
Although material factors are an important aspect to predicting whether or not China's rise will be destabilizing, I have focused on the often overlooked factor of information and assessments about preferences. Focusing on how China signals its intentions to its neighbors leads to the conclusion that East Asia will adjust to China's rise, rather than balance against it. 
